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I n Chapter 2 of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), John Maynard Keynes put forward an assumption of downward rigidity in nominal wages as the cornerstone of his analysis of what happens in the labor 
market during the business cycle. According to this analysis, if the real value of 
the existing nominal wage exceeds the market-clearing level, downward nominal 
rigidity prevents arbitrage toward that level. Instead, employment is determined 
by the demand side of the labor market, and the excess supply of labor at that 
wage manifests as high unemployment. Keynes’s brief theoretical account of why 
workers refuse to accept a nominal wage reduction, even when unemployment 
is the consequence, involved workers’ concern about their wages relative to their 
reference group. Keynes did not directly address why workers would be so preoc-
cupied with their relative wage that they would prefer losing their job, even during 
a recession, to accepting a wage cut. Keynes’s empirical basis for his assumption was 
that, “whether logical or illogical, experience shows that this is how labour in fact 
behaves.” He did not provide any quantitative evidence to support this observation. 
In the 80-plus years since publication of The General Theory, Keynes’s premise 
of downward nominal wage rigidity has continued to be highly influential. This has 
much to do with its potential to address some enduring macroeconomic questions: 
to the extent that downward rigidity prevents the real value of nominal wages from 
adjusting downward sufficiently in times of recession, it offers a potential account 
How Prevalent Is Downward Rigidity in 
Nominal Wages? International Evidence 
from Payroll Records and Pay Slips
■ Michael W. L. Elsby is Professor of Economics, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United 
Kingdom. Gary Solon is Professor Emeritus of Economics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 
Michigan. Their email addresses are mike.elsby@ed.ac.uk and gary.r.solon@gmail.com. 
† For supplementary materials such as appendices, datasets, and author disclosure statements, see the 
article page at
https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.33.3.185 doi=10.1257/jep.33.3.185
Michael W. L. Elsby and Gary Solon
186     Journal of Economic Perspectives
for cyclical unemployment fluctuations. In addition, by implying that higher 
inflation might enable real wage reductions that otherwise would be impeded by 
downward nominal wage rigidity, it provides a potential foundation for a Phillips 
curve trade-off between inflation and unemployment. A quintessential implica-
tion, noted prominently in Tobin’s (1972) presidential address to the American 
Economic Association and extended in Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry’s (1996) influ-
ential paper, is that positive inflation can “grease the wheels of the labor market.”
As rates of inflation have subsided in recent decades, and with the onset of 
the Great Recession, interest in Keynes’s hypothesis of downward nominal wage 
rigidity has naturally revived, inspiring an array of modern applications. Formal 
theories of the Phillips curve in the short and long run have been developed and 
extended to analyze the persistent rise in US unemployment that accompanied the 
Great Recession (Benigno and Ricci 2011; Daly and Hobijn 2014). In international 
macroeconomics, the adverse interaction of downward nominal wage rigidity with 
currency pegs has been advanced as a key determinant of recent rises in unem-
ployment in the eurozone and its periphery (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2016). 
Most recently, the asymmetric nature of downward nominal wage rigidity has been 
invoked to provide a potential explanation for asymmetries in unemployment fluc-
tuations over the business cycle (Dupraz, Nakamura, and Steinsson 2018).
An attractive feature of Keynes’s hypothesis is that, in principle, it is amenable to 
empirical testing. An economy subject to a binding downward constraint on nominal 
wage changes should bear two hallmarks: a scarcity of nominal wage cuts and a conse-
quent abundance of nominal wage freezes. Accordingly, a large empirical literature 
has sought to provide measures of the frequencies of nominal wage cuts and freezes, 
aided by the increasing availability of the requisite longitudinal data on individual 
wages. 
Until recently, most such evidence had been based on reports of job stayers 
obtained from household surveys. That evidence, defying simple conclusions, 
seemed to suggest not only that nominal wage cuts are quite common (indicating 
a degree of downward flexibility in nominal wages) but also that nominal wage 
freezes are similarly common (indicating a degree of nominal rigidity). To compli-
cate matters further, both results have been discounted on the grounds that they 
could be artifacts of the considerable response error in household surveys. Thus, 
despite the seeming testability of Keynes’s hypothesis, a clear assessment of the 
empirical basis for downward nominal rigidity has proved elusive because of the 
difficulty of obtaining reliable estimates of the incidence of nominal wage changes.
The main point of the present paper is to draw attention to a more recent 
literature that, cumulatively, has made considerable progress on these challenges. 
In our view, the most compelling way to address a concern over measurement error 
is to seek more accurate data. The literature we survey focuses on wage data taken 
from employers’ payroll records and pay slips. We believe this growing body of 
evidence has been undernoticed, perhaps because the studies have been scattered 
across many countries and across journals in multiple fields in economics, but also 
because several sources of such data have become available only recently.
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Here we gather studies for Great Britain, the United States, West Germany, 
Austria, Italy, Spain, Mexico, Ireland, South Korea, Portugal, Sweden, and Finland. 
Collectively, they make an important point: except in extreme circumstances (when 
nominal wage cuts are either legally prohibited or rendered beside the point by very 
high inflation), nominal wage cuts from one year to the next appear quite common, 
typically affecting 15–25 percent of job stayers in periods of low inflation. Consistent 
with this picture of downward flexibility, nominal wage freezes are found to be much 
less frequent, typically affecting less than 8 percent of job stayers, and there is little 
evidence for large accumulations of wage freezes in times of low inflation. 
None of this denies the existence of some nominal wage stickiness. Like most of 
our readers, we have our salaries set in nominal terms and typically see them adjusted 
only once a year. But does it follow from such apparent wage stickiness that nominal 
wages cannot be cut, even when inefficient layoffs or hiring decisions are the alterna-
tive? In light of the emerging evidence from more accurate wage data, we will conclude 
that the assumption that nominal wages cannot be cut needs to be reconsidered.
Some Modern Perspectives on the Economics of Downward Wage 
Rigidity
It has been more than 80 years since Keynes posited that nominal wages cannot 
be cut and that inefficient layoffs into unemployment are the result. As documented 
above, many (though far from all) modern macroeconomists still use these assump-
tions as key elements of their analysis. Even so, much has changed over these 80-plus 
years in how labor economists and macroeconomists think about the labor market, 
and some of the new ideas matter for the economics of downward wage rigidity and 
its potential effects on labor market allocations.
To begin with, the interpretation of Keynes summarized in our opening 
paragraph provides a simple “spot market” view of the labor market. But a distinctive 
characteristic of employment relationships is that they are frequently long term in 
nature: employees often work for the same employer for extended periods of time. 
This observation has important implications for the economics of wage rigidity. As 
noted since the seminal work of Becker (1962), the effective price of labor ceases 
to be simply the flow wage; rather, it is the expected present discounted value of 
the stream of wages anticipated over the course of the employment relationship. In 
addition, the seeming paradox of Keynes’s theory—that workers will refuse nominal 
wage cuts, even when unemployment is the alternative—is thrown into sharper 
relief once the durability of employment relationships is acknowledged. The theory 
implies that an existing gainful exchange of labor is forfeit by a refusal to countenance 
a wage cut, even when it is mutually advantageous for both firm and worker to 
do so (Barro 1977). A corollary of these implications is that all that is required to 
obviate such inefficient layoffs is that (the present value of) wages be sufficiently 
flexible at the point when separation is potentially at issue. Subject to this requirement, 
flow wages can otherwise be arbitrarily rigid and indeed can accommodate many of 
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the outward signs of downward nominal wage rigidity. Nominal wages can remain 
constant for periods of time if neither firm nor worker wishes to separate. And when 
nominal wages are adjusted, they naturally will rise more often than they fall, owing, 
for example, to the presence of inflation (Malcomson 1997). 
This perspective cautions against leaping from the premise of apparent wage 
stickiness to the conclusion that inefficient layoffs, and therefore increased unem-
ployment, must ensue. Because these arguments have informed the majority of 
modern macroeconomic analyses of labor markets, it is important to articulate 
potential channels through which rigid wages in general, and downwardly rigid 
nominal wages in particular, still may affect labor market allocations.
A first channel relates to another conceptual development in macroeconomic 
modeling that considers the implications of wage rigidity for hiring as well as layoff 
decisions. Becker’s (1962) insight suggests that hiring incentives will be shaped by 
the present value of wages firms must offer to newly hired workers. Hires will fall 
more precipitously during recessions if firms perceive such present values to be 
inflexible—for example, if the wages of both newly hired and incumbent workers 
are sticky (Shimer 2004; Hall 2005). Importantly, there is evidence to suggest that 
the wages of newly hired and incumbent workers are not set in isolation. Bewley’s 
(1999) interviews of managers highlighted the role of the internal wage structure 
within firms in linking the wages of new hires to those of incumbent workers. If new 
hires are paid according to existing wage structures, perhaps for reasons of equal 
treatment, any rigidity in incumbent wages is then propagated onto the wages of 
new hires (Gertler and Trigari 2009; Snell and Thomas 2010). An implication of 
this view is that any downward rigidity in nominal wages of job stayers will addi-
tionally contribute to downward nominal rigidity among new hires’ wages, thereby 
depressing hiring incentives in times of recession.
A second channel relates to an even better-known message from Bewley’s (1999) 
book. In a variation on Keynes’s assumption that workers refuse wage cuts, what Bewley 
heard from the managers he interviewed was that even if they did not withdraw their 
labor altogether, workers disgruntled by a wage cut would be likely to exert less effort 
on the job. Employers therefore are reluctant to impose wage cuts for fear of adverse 
productivity consequences. This evidence reinforces our impression that downward 
wage stickiness is indeed a fact of labor market life. It is also natural to hypothesize 
that the prospect of such productivity losses might have allocational effects. The 
evidence provides a potential motive for excess layoffs that, in the words of one of 
Bewley’s interviewees, “get the misery out the door.”1 Likewise, the anticipation of 
1 Another of Bewley’s (1999) messages, which we believe the economics profession has mostly over-
looked, suggests that downward stickiness may not be so extreme as to force inefficient layoff or hiring 
decisions. On p. 16 of his introductory chapter, Bewley says that his “mistaken” prior view had been that 
“an individual firm could save a significant number of jobs by reducing pay. This is seldom true, and the 
firms for which it is true are precisely the ones most likely to cut pay.” His detailed evidence appears in 
his section 11.3, which begins, “I was surprised to learn that most managers did not believe that pay cuts 
would prevent many layoffs.” This finding is altogether consistent with the Becker–Barro–Malcomson 
point that short-term wage stickiness need not induce inefficient allocation decisions.
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such productivity losses in the future might in turn further retard firms’ incentives to 
hire. Both of these forces might be expected to contribute to unemployment in times 
of recession.
Collectively, these developments in economic thinking (along with many 
others not discussed here) recognize that the labor market is much more complex 
than the bare-bones model presented in Keynes (1936). Nevertheless, there remain 
important potential channels through which downward wage rigidity can have 
unemployment consequences, on both hiring and layoff margins. We still are left 
with the same fundamental questions: Just how prevalent is downward rigidity in 
nominal wages, and what are the ramifications for the efficiency of layoff and hiring 
decisions? Our answers to these questions should be informed by the best available 
evidence, which is the subject of the remainder of this paper.
Evidence from Employer Payroll Records and Pay Slips
Most studies on nominal wage rigidity have sought to provide measures of year-
to-year changes in individual workers’ nominal wages from longitudinal microdata. 
Because much evidence shows that those changing employers typically realize wage 
changes, these studies have focused on the subsample of individuals who are job 
stayers.2 For a long time, the majority of such measures were based on longitudinal 
analyses of household surveys, inspired by influential early studies of the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics and the Current Population Survey in the United States 
(McLaughlin 1994; Card and Hyslop 1996; Kahn 1997). As we have noted, such studies 
typically have found not only a substantial fraction of nominal wage cuts among job 
stayers but also a similarly common incidence of nominal wage freezes. For example, 
our own 2016 Journal of Labor Economics paper with Donggyun Shin, which tracked job 
stayers from one January to the next in the Current Population Survey, found that the 
percentage measured as receiving a nominal wage cut was regularly between 15 and 
25 percent (Elsby, Shin, and Solon 2016). In the same data, the percentage recorded 
with zero nominal wage change was frequently in the range of 10 to 20 percent.
However, such findings have been open to the criticism that household survey 
reports of wages are notoriously subject to response error. As many authors have 
pointed out, such errors could bias the results in either direction—that is, toward 
finding either more or less wage rigidity. On one hand, differences in individual 
response errors across survey years may exaggerate the appearance of wage flex-
ibility: for example, someone whose nominal wage did not really decrease could 
still be measured as receiving a wage cut, and cases in which nominal wages truly 
2 As foreshadowed by the discussion in our previous section, an important example of what these studies 
have not attempted to measure is the rigidity of the wages of newly hired workers. Addressing this ques-
tion empirically is surprisingly difficult because it calls for hiring wage data over time for the same jobs 
within the same firms, and such data are hard to come by. The effort by Martins, Solon, and Thomas 
(2012) uses the same Portuguese census of employers we cite later in this article and finds that real hiring 
wages in Portugal were highly procyclical over the period from 1982 to 2008.
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did not change could be recorded as wage changes. Such concerns have motivated 
some authors, such as Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996) and Altonji and Devereux 
(1999), to suggest that the appearance of frequent nominal wage cuts in household 
surveys is an artifact of measurement error. On the other hand, if wage reports are 
subject to rounding errors, modest wage changes will be recorded as wage freezes, 
exaggerating the appearance of wage rigidity. The upshot, of course, is that the 
nature of the bias depends on the presumed structure of response errors. Indeed, 
one approach taken in a portion of the literature, exemplified by some of the work 
discussed in this journal by Dickens et al. (2007), has attempted to correct for 
measurement error by imposing assumptions about the measurement error process. 
The studies we review here take a more direct, and we think more persuasive, 
approach to addressing concerns over measurement error—namely, to seek more 
accurate data. In particular, we turn to administrative data from payroll records and 
pay slips that allow a researcher to track individual workers and the jobs they do across 
years and that contain accurate information on wages. Our survey identified 13 such 
sources of data for 12 countries. We distill relevant information from these in Table 1. 
For each study, the table summarizes the data source, the wage measure,3 and the 
percentages of job stayers recorded as receiving either nominal wage cuts or zero 
change in their nominal wages. In the remainder of this section, we provide some 
context for the contents of Table 1. We pay particular attention to how each study 
addresses the measurement challenges noted above and the implications for the prev-
alence of downward nominal wage rigidity.
Great Britain
The first steps in the quest for more accurate wage data were taken in the British 
literature, so we will begin there. The first row of Table 1 summarizes the pioneering 
study by Smith (2000), who analyzed the 1991–1996 waves of the British Household 
Panel Study. In many respects, this longitudinal household survey resembles the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics for the United States. Indeed, Smith’s initial results based 
on these data resembled those based on US household surveys, measuring nontrivial 
minorities of respondents as receiving both wage cuts and wage freezes. 
Smith also discovered, however, that the British Household Panel Study incor-
porated a feature that was unique at the time: respondents were allowed to check 
their pay slips when reporting their wages, and the survey recorded who did so. 
Smith’s results thus provided a first glimpse of the implications of more accurate 
wage data for the prevalence of downward nominal wage rigidity. 
The results were striking. Even among the subsample of respondents who 
consulted their pay slips, the incidence of nominal wage cuts remained considerable; 
3 In most instances, the measure does not include nonwage compensation. In the United States, where 
fringe benefits such as employer-provided health insurance loom large, this is a potentially significant 
omission. Lebow, Saks, and Wilson (2003) have argued that fringe benefits are an additional dimension 
for adjustment in compensation, so overlooking them is likely to make total compensation seem less 
flexible than it actually is. A similar point applies to variation in work effort.
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the percentage with negative nominal wage change was 17.8 percent. By contrast, 
a much smaller percentage of the subsample who consulted their paychecks, just 
5.6 percent, reported zero nominal wage change. Set in a context of low inflation 
rates—which averaged around 3 percent in Britain over Smith’s sample period—
the abundance of wage cuts and paucity of wage freezes are especially notable. 
At the time, Smith (2000) was at pains to acknowledge surprise at her results: 
“Some of the results in this paper may seem difficult to believe—the quite common 
occurrence of nominal pay cuts, for example. It may well be that the difficulty in 
believing them stems not from the weight of contradictory evidence, but rather from 
conventional wisdom that has survived because of the previous lack of evidence 
either way.” Since then, however, evidence amassed from a diverse range of sources 
has vindicated Smith’s early findings.
Inspired by Smith’s (2000) results, Nickell and Quintini (2003) identified 
another source of accurate wage data in the New Earnings Survey for Great Britain. 
This survey comprises a 1 percent sample of income tax–paying workers, defined 
by those whose National Insurance numbers (for social security) end in a given pair 
of digits. Because the same pair of digits has been used since the survey’s inception, 
this survey allows one to track the same individuals over time. In the spirit of Smith’s 
use of reports from pay slips, the New Earnings Survey data are also thought to 
provide unusually accurate information on individual earnings because the survey 
is administered to employers, who are legally required to report such information 
from their payroll records for a reference week each April. 
The data from the New Earnings Survey also come with additional 
methodological advantages over the British Household Panel Study. Accompanying 
the data on weekly earnings are employer-reported payroll data on employee 
work hours for the survey reference week, permitting an analysis of hourly wages. 
Moreover, the New Earnings Survey records separate measures of components of 
earnings and hours, most notably those attributable to overtime. Because it is not 
obvious that, for example, reductions in hourly earnings associated with reductions 
in overtime should be interpreted as wage cuts, an advantage of the New Earnings 
Survey is that it allows one to focus on hourly wages exclusive of overtime. Finally, 
because it is based on a 1 percent sample of income tax–paying workers in Britain, 
the sample sizes it offers are large. 
Nickell and Quintini’s (2003) results dovetail with Smith’s (2000) earlier 
findings. For the 1991–1996 period, over which the two studies overlap, the New 
Earnings Survey data produce results that mirror closely those for the respondents 
to the British Household Panel Study who checked their pay slips. When Nickell 
and Quintini widened their analysis to their full 1975–1999 sample period, they 
continued to find substantial numbers of nominal wage cuts and a relative scarcity 
of nominal wage freezes. 
Motivated by the onset and aftermath of the global financial crisis, our 2016 
paper with Donggyun Shin replicated Nickell and Quintini’s (2003) analysis and 
provided an update through the Great Recession to the year 2012. As summarized 
here in the second row of Table 1, our measured percentages of job stayers with 
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nominal wage cuts ranged from a low of 4.9 percent in the period 1979–1980 (when 
inflation was around 20 percent) to a high of 23.5 percent in the wake of the Great 
Recession in both 2009–2010 and 2011–2012. Strikingly, the latter is by no means 
an aberration: over the last 20 years of the sample period, when the inflation rate in 
Britain hovered around 3 percent, the percentage of job stayers receiving nominal 
wage cuts was regularly close to 20 percent. Mirroring this impression of downward 
Table 1 
Percentages of Job Stayers Receiving Year-to-Year Nominal Wage Cuts and Freezes
Study Data source Wage measure
Percentage 
receiving 
wage cuts
Percentage 
receiving 
wage freezes
Smith (2000) British Household Panel 
Study, 1991–1996
Usual weekly pay from 
recent pay slip
17.8 5.6
Elsby, Shin,  
and Solon (2016)
British New Earnings 
Survey, 1975–2012
Earnings/hours  
excluding overtime for 
reference week in April
4.9a–23.5 0.4a–9.1
Jardim, Solon,  
and Vigdor (2019)
Washington State unem-
ployment insurance 
records, 2005–2015
Quarterly earnings/
hours
20.4–33.1 2.5–7.7
Bauer, Bonin, Goette,  
and Sunde (2007)
West German IABS-Rb 
from social security 
records, 1975–1976, 
1980–1981, … , 
2000–2001
Annual earnings/work 
days for full-time  
workers employed  
on July 1
9.4–24.9 3.9–11.2
Evidence prepared for 
this survey by Andreas 
Steinhauer and Josef 
Zweimuller
Austrian Social Security 
Database, 2002–2012
Annual earnings/
work days for full-time 
workers employed on 
March 15
13.0–18.6 0.1–1.5
Devicienti, Maida,  
and Sestito (2007)
Worker History Italian 
Panel from social secu-
rity records, 1988–1989 
and 1998–1999
Annual earnings/
work days for full-time 
workers
7.7 and 
18.3
4.0 and 8.5
Evidence prepared for 
OECD (2014) by Marcel 
Jansen, Sergi Jiménez,  
and José Ignacio García 
Pérez
Spanish Muestra 
Continua de Vidas 
Laborales from social 
security records, 
2007–2010
Monthly earnings for 
full-time full-month 
workers
18.0–31.0 1.8–8.4
Castellanos, García-Verdú, 
and Kaplan (2004)
Mexican Social Security 
Institute records, 
1985–2001
Daily comprehensivec  
wage on last day of 
quarter
0.2a–10.7 3.9a–16.5d
Doris, O’Neill, and 
Sweetman (2015)
Irish EU Survey of 
Income and Living 
Conditions, 2006–2011
Earnings/hours from 
recent pay slip for full-
time full-year workerse
24.5–50.1 3.3–14.2
Park and Shin (2017) South Korean Survey 
of Labor Conditions by 
Type of Employment, 
2008–2013
Monthly earnings/
hours excluding  
overtime and  
incentive pay in June
25.3–56.0 0.0–0.2
Continued on next page
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flexibility, the incidence of zero nominal wage change was much smaller, varying 
from a low of 0.4 percent in the high-inflation period of 1979–1980 to a high of 
9.1 percent in 2011–2012 and remaining below 3 percent in most years of the sample.
Like earlier researchers, we were intrigued by these findings, which motivated 
us to question whether similar studies might be feasible for other countries. As the 
Table 1 (Continued) 
Percentages of Job Stayers Receiving Year-to-Year Nominal Wage Cuts and Freezes
Study Data source Wage measure
Percentage 
receiving 
wage cuts
Percentage 
receiving 
wage freezes
Carneiro, Portugal, 
and Varejão (2014)
Portuguese Quadros 
de Pessoal, 1986–1989, 
1991–2000, and 
2002–2016
Monthly base wage/
normal monthly hours 
for full-time workers in 
reference monthf
2.2–6.3 3.2–76.0
Ekberg (2004) Employer surveys 
by Confederation of 
Swedish Enterprise, 
1970–1990 and 
1995–1999
White-collar:  
Comprehensiveg  
earnings/hours in  
reference month
White-
collar: 
0.1a–10.0
White-
collar: 
0.2a–6.0
Blue-collar:  
Hourly base wage in 
second quarter
Blue-
collar: 
0.3a–3.9
Blue-
collar: 
0.0a–0.3
Vainiomäki  
(forthcoming)
Statistics Finland 
data based mostly on 
employer surveys by 
employer associations, 
1995–2013
Earnings/hours 
excluding overtime in 
September, October,  
or fourth quarter
11.1–22.9 0.3–17.1
Note: Job stayers are defined as workers staying with the same employer; the British, Irish, Korean, 
Swedish, and Finnish studies also require that the workers stay in the same job within the firm. 
  a These data points correspond to periods of high inflation. They relate to 1979–1980 for Great 
Britain, when the inflation rate reached 20 percent; a period of hyperinflation in Mexico in the 
1980s; and a period from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s in Sweden when the inflation rate regularly 
reached double digits. 
  b The IABS-R is part of the German Institute for Employment Research Employment Samples (IABS). 
It is a 2 percent random sample drawn from social security records.
  c The Mexican wage measure “is a comprehensive measure of wages plus benefits, including payments 
made in cash, bonuses, premiums, room and board, commissions, benefits in kind and any other 
amount paid or benefit received.” 
  d This excludes three outliers in the periods 1991:4–1992:4, 1996:4–1997:4, and 1998:4–1999:4, when 
increases in nominal minimum wages were not synchronized with the reporting dates. In each of 
these cases, the incidence of wage freezes exceeded 30 percent, at the expense of similar declines in 
the incidence of wage increases.  
  e The results from pay slips on earnings per hour are not reported in Doris, O’Neill, and Sweetman 
(2015), but they were kindly provided to us by Aedin Doris. 
  f Additional results not reported in Carneiro, Portugal, and Varejão (2014) were kindly provided to 
us by Pedro Portugal. 
  g The wage measure we cite for Swedish white-collar workers includes overtime, bonuses, and fringe 
benefits. Our reported percentage receiving wage cuts is a weighted average of the percentages Ekberg 
(2004) reports for white-collar workers who do and do not receive such supplementary payments. 
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remaining rows of Table 1 attest, it turns out that a body of such studies now exists, 
albeit one that has accumulated sporadically over a variety of journals spanning a 
range of fields of economics and that, in some cases, has become available only very 
recently. 
United States
Although it is possible to access individual earnings data from some administra-
tive sources in the United States, until recently it seemed that none contained the 
data on individual hours required to permit an analysis of hourly wages. However, 
thanks to the research of Kurmann, McEntarfer, and Spletzer (2016), considerable 
progress has been made on this seeming impasse. Their starting point was that US 
employers are obliged to report payroll data to state unemployment insurance agen-
cies to enable determination of their employees’ benefit entitlements in the event 
that the employees become unemployed and file an unemployment insurance 
claim. In most states, this requires employers to report the quarterly earnings of 
their employees. The key discovery by Kurmann, McEntarfer, and Spletzer was that 
a few states—Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Washington—also require employers 
to report their employees’ quarterly hours of work. Among these, the case of Wash-
ington is especially useful because entitlement to unemployment insurance benefits 
in that state depends on hours as well as earnings, so the reports of both variables are 
thought to be especially accurate. Moreover, because these data are a near-complete 
census of employees in the state, they allow a researcher to track over time the wages 
of employees who remain with the same employer.
Two research teams—Kurmann and McEntarfer (2018) and Jardim, Solon, and 
Vigdor (2019)—have used the Washington data to study job stayers’ year-to-year 
changes in quarterly average hourly earnings, and both have obtained results similar 
to those in the British studies. The third row of Table 1 summarizes the results 
from Jardim, Solon, and Vigdor, which are for the period 2005–2015. This period 
includes years before, during, and after the Great Recession, so although inflation 
was moderate throughout the period, business cycle conditions were wildly variable. 
Even during the expansion periods, the percentage receiving nominal wage cuts was 
more than 20 percent, with a minimum of 20.4 percent between the first quarters of 
2006 and 2007. The percentage rose even higher during the Great Recession, with 
a high of 33.1 percent between the fourth quarters of 2008 and 2009. Mirroring 
this, the percentage receiving no nominal wage change typically remained below 
4 percent, varying from a low of 2.5 percent between the fourth quarters of 2006 
and 2007 to a maximum of just 7.7 percent at the height of the recession between 
the second quarters of 2009 and 2010. We are struck by the extent to which these 
results echo the British ones summarized above.
A contrast with the British studies using the New Earnings Survey, however, is 
that those studies were able to adopt a wage measure that explicitly excludes over-
time pay and hours. Because overtime cannot be separated out in the Washington 
data, it is possible that some of the wage cuts measured for Washington could reflect 
reductions in overtime. As we noted above, these arguably should not be interpreted 
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economically as wage reductions. Jardim, Solon, and Vigdor (2019) therefore redid 
their analysis for a subsample of workers who appeared to work 40 hours a week every 
week in each quarter. Even in this subsample, the frequency of nominal wage cuts was 
striking, ranging from a low of 14.5 percent between the third quarters of 2006 and 
2007 to a high of 31.8 percent between the fourth quarters of 2008 and 2009.4
Evidence from Other Countries
Payroll records or pay slips have been used to study job stayers’ nominal wage 
changes in many other countries, as shown in the remainder of Table 1. An Irish 
study included evidence similar to Smith’s (2000) pay slip–based evidence for Great 
Britain. In Portugal and South Korea, the data were generated by government 
surveys of employers. In Sweden and Finland, the employer surveys were conducted 
by employer associations. As Table 1 documents, all of these studies allow an analysis 
of hourly wages similar to those we have summarized above for Great Britain and 
the United States.
In the studies for West Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain, and Mexico, the data 
are taken from employers’ reports to their countries’ social security systems. Since 
social security provisions typically do not require information on hours worked, 
most of these studies instead have focused on measurement of a daily wage. For 
West Germany, Austria, and Italy, this is computed as the ratio of annual earnings to 
days worked at a given employer. For Mexico, the daily wage is that measured on the 
last day of each quarter. Similarly, in Spain, the wage measure is based on monthly 
earnings for individuals who worked for the entire month. To allay concerns that 
changes in measured daily wages reflect changes in hours worked per day, all but 
one of these studies (the Mexican case) additionally focus on individuals recorded 
as working full time in the administrative data.
Not surprisingly, the patterns vary considerably across countries. We think it is 
a fair summary to say that, outside of conditions of very high price inflation, most of 
the countries continue to show substantial minorities of job stayers receiving nominal 
wage cuts and much smaller minorities experiencing zero nominal wage change.
According to the Italian study by Devicienti, Maida, and Sestito (2007), for 
example, in the period 1988–1989, when inflation was a relatively high 6.5 percent, 
the percentage receiving nominal wage cuts was “only” 7.7 percent. In the period 
1998–1999, when inflation was under 2 percent, the percentage receiving wage 
cuts was 18.3 percent. Qualitatively similar results are reported for West Germany 
by Bauer, Bonin, Goette, and Sunde (2007) and for Spain by the OECD (2014), 
except that the percentage receiving wage cuts ran somewhat higher, peaking at 
24.9 percent in 1995–1996 for West Germany and at 31.0 percent in 2009–2010 in 
4 A preliminary manuscript by Grigsby, Hurst, and Yildirmaz (2018) that uses US data from the ADP 
payroll processing company finds that base pay reductions are rare in expansion years, but that reduc-
tions in overall earnings per hour are strikingly common, even with overtime excluded. This finding 
regarding the role of compensation other than base pay (such as bonuses) in nominal wage adjustment 
echoes a similar finding in the literature on cyclicality in real wages (see Shin and Solon 2007 and the 
references therein). 
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the aftermath of the especially severe Great Recession in Spain. For all three coun-
tries, the percentage of job stayers recorded with no wage change never rose much 
above 10 percent.
The Austrian evidence, kindly prepared for this survey by Andreas Steinhauer 
and Josef Zweimuller, again points to a considerable prevalence of nominal wage 
cuts. Over a 2002–2012 sample period that rarely saw inflation rise above 3 percent, 
the percentage receiving nominal wage cuts ranged from 13.0 to 18.6 percent. Strik-
ingly, nominal wage freezes were exceedingly rare in the Austrian data, affecting 
less than 2 percent of job stayers. Vainiomäki’s (forthcoming) results for Finland 
are fairly similar. The percentage receiving nominal wage cuts was always more 
than 11 percent and was usually more than 15 percent. In all but two of the sample 
 period’s 18 years, the percentage with wage freezes was 5 percent or less.
Inflation plays a particularly important role in the Mexican results reported 
by Castellanos, García-Verdú, and Kaplan (2004). In the early part of their 1985–
2001 sample period, when annual inflation soared (reaching almost 160 percent!), 
nominal wage cuts were extremely rare. At the end, when inflation was just starting 
to moderate to single digits, the percentage receiving wage cuts had risen to 
10.7 percent. At the same time, aside from a few periods in which rises in the nominal 
minimum wage were delayed, no more than 16.5 percent of job stayers experienced 
no change in their nominal wage.
The outliers in Table 1 are especially instructive. At one extreme are the results 
reported by Doris, O’Neill, and Sweetman (2015) for Ireland, where the Great 
Recession hit especially hard and involved a price deflation. In the period 2009–
2010, the percentage of job stayers receiving nominal wage cuts reached a striking 
50.1 percent. Even in the depths of the crisis in Ireland, the incidence of nominal 
wage freezes rose no higher than 14.2 percent. 
In their results for South Korea, Park and Shin (2017) report a similarly 
extreme frequency of wage cuts, which affected as much as 56.0 percent of job 
stayers in 2008–2009, when both output growth and inflation were close to zero. An 
equally striking aspect of the South Korean data, however, is that the percentage of 
job stayers experiencing zero change in their nominal wage was negligible. The data 
for South Korea thus exhibit none of the empirical hallmarks of downward nominal 
wage rigidity, in precisely the macroeconomic context in which one might expect 
to find them.5
At the other extreme is Portugal, where Carneiro, Portugal, and Varejão (2014) 
report that nominal wage cuts were “virtually non-existent” throughout the 1987–
2009 period, affecting no more than 6 percent of job stayers. This makes sense 
because Portugal has a national law that explicitly prohibits such cuts. Consistent 
with this, the incidence of nominal wage freezes in Portugal rose to unparalleled 
levels during the Great Recession, when zero change in hourly pay was recorded for 
up to 76.0 percent of job stayers.
5 A newer study by Park and Shin (forthcoming) extends their evidence back to 1986.
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At first blush, the situation seems somewhat similar in Sweden. For blue-collar 
workers, Ekberg (2004, chap. 1) reports that between 0.3 and 3.9 percent received 
hourly base wage cuts. He explains that, “given the framework of the terms of 
employment, it is impossible for the employers to cut wages unilaterally. Hence, 
a wage cut can only be achieved under mutual consent,” and even then it cannot 
violate applicable collective bargaining agreements. In stark contrast to the Portu-
guese case, however, almost none of these Swedish job stayers experienced a 
nominal pay freeze. Moreover, although Ekberg reports very low percentages of 
white-collar workers with wage cuts at the beginning of his sample period (when 
inflation was in double digits and very few white-collar workers received any 
supplementary pay), by the end inflation was much lower, a majority of white-
collar workers received some supplementary pay, and the percentage receiving 
pay cuts rose as high as 10.0 percent. 
Figure 1 supplements Table 1 by providing a visual representation of the 
frequency of nominal wage cuts as a function of inflation. For the sake of a read-
able scale, the figure excludes the Mexican observations in which the inflation rate 
exceeds 20 percent (sometimes by a lot!) and the associated frequency of nominal 
wage cuts is negligible. Like Table 1, Figure 1 indicates that, outside of periods 
of particularly high inflation, most countries exhibit surprisingly high frequencies 
of nominal wage cuts. In addition, the figure reveals a general tendency for the 
frequency of wage cuts to rise as inflation falls. The glaring exception is Portugal, 
where a national prohibition of nominal wage cuts makes it the canonical example 
of Keynes’s premise that nominal wages cannot be cut. As discussed above, while 
nominal wage cuts appear to be rare in Sweden as well, there is little evidence there 
for an associated buildup of wage freezes. Otherwise, the evidence accumulated 
from payroll records and pay slips suggests that nominal wage cuts occur more 
commonly than most of us had thought.
Some Nuances
Having found that nominal wage decreases occur with surprising frequency, we 
can inquire further about how they are distributed throughout the labor market. 
Recent findings suggest that the overall flexibility we report is pervasive, in two 
senses.
First, Elsby, Shin, and Solon (2016) point out that the nominal wage cuts 
observed in the British New Earnings Survey “are remarkably pervasive across 
sub-groups of workers/jobs. For example, in 2011–2012, when the overall propor-
tion of job stayers experiencing cuts was 23.5%, the proportions were 22% in the 
private sector and 26% in the public sector; 27% for union workers and 22% for 
nonunion workers; at least 20% for every single-digit occupation; and 32% for 
workers who received incentive pay in either 2011 or 2012 and 22% for workers 
who did not.” The study of Washington State data by Jardim, Solon, and Vigdor 
(2019) also presents some disaggregated analyses, and it similarly finds that the 
common occurrence of nominal wage cuts is pervasive across both industries and 
firm sizes. Even in the utilities industry—the industry that tends to show the fewest 
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nominal wage cuts—the percentage receiving cuts was almost always 15 percent 
or greater.6
Second, recent studies with access to rich employer-employee matched data 
have begun to investigate whether firms cutting wages do so for nearly all their 
workers or target the cuts on selected subgroups. For example, if 20 percent of all 
the job stayers in a particular period show wage cuts, this could happen because 
20 percent of the stayers in every firm receive wage cuts or because the cuts occur 
6 Another type of heterogeneity that future research could explore is with respect to whether economic 
shocks are general or idiosyncratic to the firm. The recent study by Juhn, McCue, Monti, and Pierce 
(2018) concludes that “the transmission of firm-level shocks to earnings of stayers is minimal in the US 
labor market.”
Notes: This figure provides a visual representation of the frequency of nominal wage cuts as a function 
of inflation based on the literature survey summarized in Table 1. Inflation rates corresponding to the 
NES data for Great Britain are from Elsby, Shin, and Solon (2016). Inflation rates for all other studies 
are from OECD data (https://data.oecd.org/price/inflation-cpi.htm). For studies with annual data, 
corresponding annual inflation rates are used. For studies with quarterly data, corresponding quarterly 
inflation rates are used and then simple annual averages are taken. For studies with many years of 
data, the figure plots a selected sample of years, chosen to include both the minimum and maximum 
percentage of wage cuts reported in Table 1 and otherwise evenly sampled across the available years. 
Finally, the figure focuses on periods for each study in which the inflation rate was no greater than 20 
percent. Country abbreviations are OECD country codes. Other abbreviations: BHPS, British Household 
Panel Study; NES, New Earnings Survey.  
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universally in firms that employ 20 percent of stayers but not at all in other firms. 
Where between these extremes does the reality lie? To explore this question with 
the Washington State data, Jardim, Solon, and Vigdor (2019) created for each job 
stayer receiving a wage cut the following variable: the percentage of that worker’s 
job-staying coworkers that also received a wage cut in the same period. In every 
period studied, it turned out that the majority of job stayers receiving nominal 
wage cuts worked for firms that cut the wages of between 10 and 50 percent of 
their job stayers. Jardim, Solon, and Vigdor also noted a tendency for these selec-
tive wage cuts to be more concentrated in the upper half of within-firm wage 
distributions. Park and Shin (2017) have reported similar findings for South 
Korea, noting that the prevalence of nominal wage cuts summarized in Table 1 
stems from “a majority of employers cutting a fraction of their workers’ wages 
fairly routinely.”
We regard these details as promising points of departure for further research. 
They suggest that nominal wage cuts are not only surprisingly common but also 
broadly distributed across sectors and firms. 
Summary and Discussion
For more than 80 years, many (though far from all) influential macroeconomic 
analyses of the labor market have been premised on the assumption that nominal 
wages cannot be cut. Some classic studies that used longitudinal household surveys 
to track job stayers from year to year measured a high incidence of wage cuts, but 
this evidence reasonably was discounted on the grounds that the measurement of 
frequent wage cuts could be an artifact of survey response error.
The main point of the present paper has been to synthesize a more recent 
international collection of studies that have sought out more accurate wage data 
from employers’ payroll records and pay slips. Outside of circumstances where 
nominal wage cuts have been legally prohibited or rendered irrelevant by very high 
price inflation, most of this evidence has continued to show that nominal wage cuts 
occur more frequently than has commonly been supposed.
Most of us are surprised by this finding, not only because of the persistent influ-
ence of Keynes’s (1936) contrary assumption in The General Theory but also because 
introspection, casual empiricism, and Bewley’s (1999) interviews tell us that workers 
really do dislike nominal wage cuts and employers are therefore reluctant to impose 
them. But is this obvious aversion to wage cuts so extreme as to bind even when 
inefficient layoffs into unemployment are the alternative? The accumulated inter-
national evidence showing that nominal wage cuts occur frequently should inspire 
reconsideration of the commonly invoked assumption that nominal wages cannot be 
cut even when efficiency of allocation decisions is at stake.
Of course, because the evidence reviewed here is based on longitudinal tracking 
of job stayers, it pertains directly only to wage rigidity for incumbent workers. As 
discussed above, a related question is how flexible wages are for the hiring of new 
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workers. Some recent models have assumed that wage rigidity for incumbents spills 
over into wage rigidity for new hires. In that light, the evidence reported here is 
indirectly pertinent for hiring wages. If nominal wage cuts are feasible for incum-
bent workers, why would they not be for new workers?
The development of theoretically coherent and empirically relevant accounts 
of what happens in the labor market over the business cycle remains a crucial 
mission for economic research. We hope to support that effort by providing a more 
accurate picture of the frequency and nature of nominal wage cuts. 
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